To do so requires coordinated effort, common scenarios the services can work from, and the synchronized use of multiple diagnostic techniques.Ĭhoosing and building the right innovative force is hard. By recreating the cycle of research - which was a success during the Cold War - the Department of Defense can build a truly innovative joint force to take on our new challenges. Fortunately, the Department of Defense has an analytic community with the tools necessary to accomplish the task and a historically successful formula to follow if it chooses to reenergize its efforts. But this will not be sufficient unless the Department of Defense can organize its functions and incentivize integration of the disparate analytic activities. The United States has the analytic talent to implement a proper cycle of research. The detachment of wargaming and the other elements of analysis from an integrated approach cuts the military adrift from its analytic moorings just when the nation and its allies need it the most. The future force is in danger of being designed based on the impetus of services’ prerogatives and history rather than on a proper inquiry, exploration, and evaluation worthy of a joint force. His article fails to highlight the danger of the status quo, and the real risk that poorly-constructed analysis (not just wargaming) can lead to battlefield losses. In some areas, however, he doesn’t go far enough. Others work in fields which don’t directly apply, such as training or education. Many in the wargaming community are working for the very reforms he calls for. While I largely agree with Compton’s criticism, I think he paints with too large a brush.
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